Due to rapid progress in the internet and cloud computing technologies, electronic commerce is becoming more and more popular. Many people and businesses deal with their payment transactions via the Internet. The technologies of credit cards, electronic tickets, electronic cash (e-cash), and other advanced payment services have realized the vision of electronic commerce. In this paper, we proposed an off-line e-cash scheme with anonymity, unlinkability, double-spending checking, anonymity control, and fast anonymity revocation on double-spending. In an off-line e-cash scheme, the bank which could be a financial cloud server or the third party (TTP) must be able to revoke the anonymity of a user who doubly spent her/his e-cash(s). In our proposed scheme, the bank can quickly derive the identity of the user who doubly spent her/his e-cash(s) without the participation of TTP. Besides, if some illegal transactions are reported, TTP can also directly revoke the anonymity of the user who spent her/his e-cash(s) in the illegal transactions. Furthermore, we also provide traceability for the police to trace a specific user, and maybe a crime, in some situations. Finally, the security of the proposed features, unlinkability and unforgeability, are formally proved in this paper.
Introduction
The widespread availablity of networks and cloud computing is making electronic commerce more and more popular. Lots of businesses utilize computers and networks with rented resources in the cloud to deal with the transactions of their commercial activities. Besides, mobile devices have more storage and convenient network connection interfaces, such as Bluetooth, WiFi, and 3G networks. In electronic commerce, a user can trade by using the mobile device everywhere. An electronic payment mechanism is necessary for electronic commerce. In 1982, Chaum [1] proposed an e-cash scheme by exploiting his RSA-based blind signature. The bank cannot collude with shops to trace any user's consumption behavior. Furthermore, the bank needs to deal with the e-cash double-spending problem. In general, e-cash can be classified into two types, which are on-line e-cash [2, 3, 1, 4] and off-line e-cash [5] [6] [7] [8] . The bank can prevent double-spending in an on-line e-cash scheme because it performs double-spending checking before accepting an e-cash transaction. In an off-line e-cash scheme, the bank cannot prevent double-spending in advance. Therefore, the bank must be able to revoke the anonymity of the user who doubly spent her/his e-cash.
Nowadays, cloud computing is a trend and many cloud services are running on the Internet, such as Google Gmail, Dropbox, AWS EC2, etc. The privacy of a user's identity is a concern for the user in using cloud services. She/He does not want to reveal her/his identity to the cloud service provider. However, if the cloud service provider does not know the identity of the user, it is difficult to charge her/him according to her/his usage. E-cash is an important technology for a user to obtain cloud services anonymously. The user pays for cloud services without revealing her/his identity and the cloud service provider supplies services as long as it gets payment.
In our proposed off-line e-cash scheme, each user possesses anonymity and unlinkability when spending e-cash(s). We also allow the user to recover her/his lost e-cash(s). If a user doubly spends her/his e-cash, the bank can detect it and efficiently derive the identity of the user without any help of TTP. Besides, if an e-cash has been spent in an illegal transaction and reported to TTP, TTP can revoke the anonymity of the owner of the e-cash. Our e-cash scheme also allows the police to trace a specific user. Consequently, the proposed off-line e-cash scheme has anonymity, unlinkability, recoverability, and anonymous control, which contains revokeability and traceability.
Organization of the manuscript
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the related works about electronic cash schemes. In Section 3, we describe the architecture of the proposed scheme and the requirements which are necessary in our electronic cash scheme. We then present our scheme in Sections 4 and 5. In Section 6, we make characteristic analysis and compare our scheme with the others. The formal security proofs for the proposed scheme are shown in Section 7. Finally, concluding remarks are given in Section 8.
Preliminary

David Chaum's blind signature
In 1983, Chaum proposed a blind signature scheme [1] based on the RSA cryptosystem [9] . Chaum's blind signature scheme contains KeyGen, Blinding, Signing, Unblinding, and Verifying algorithms. The details of the blind signature scheme are described as follows.
• KeyGen: The input is a security parameter 1 k . The algorithm will output the public and private keys (e, n) and d.
• Blinding: A user randomly selects an integer a ∈ Z * n and computes α = a e H(m) mod n, where H is a one-way hash function and m is a message. Then the user sends the signer α.
• Signing: The signer computes t = α d mod n and sends t back to the user.
• Unblinding: After receiving t, the user computes s = ta −1 mod n and then gets a signature s on m.
• Verifying: Any one can verify whether s is a valid signature on m by checking if s e ≡ H(m) (mod n) is true or not.
Krawczyk and Rabin's scheme (Chameleon signatures)
In 2000, Krawczyk and Rabin proposed a hash function, called the trapdoor hash function [10] . They used it to construct chameleon signatures. A chameleon hash function is associated with a public key HK and a private key TK . If one knows HK , he can compute the associated hash function. But without the private key, it is infeasible to find two inputs which are mapped to the same output. If anyone has the private key, he can easily find collisions for every given input. A trapdoor hash function is a probabilistic function h HK such that it is hard to find a collision when only HK is given, but it is easy to find the collision when TK is also given. Formally speaking, given only HK , it is difficult to find two messages m 1 , m 2 • The hash family H: Given HK = (p, q, g, y) and a message m, h HK :
where r ∈ Z * q is a random-selected integer.
The architecture and requirements
In this section, we describe the architecture of our proposed off-line e-cash scheme and discuss the requirements for an off-line e-cash system.
The architecture of our e-cash scheme
There are four entities, Bank, Shop, Customer, and Judge in our e-cash scheme. The architecture is shown in Fig. 1 . First, the judge issues a judge device to the bank. The bank embeds the judge device into its system. When a customer wants to withdraw her/his e-cash(s), the judge device will be a participant in our withdrawal protocol. When a customer wants to make a payment to a shop, the customer performs an offline e-cash payment protocol with the shop. The shop stores the received e-cash after verifying the e-cash. Finally, the shop deposits the received e-cash(s) into the bank after a period of time, and the bank will deal with the double-spending checking on the e-cash(s). If double-spending happens, the bank will retrieve the identity from the e-cash directly.
Requirements
In an offline e-cash system, there are some requirements which must be satisfied.
1. Anonymity and unlinkability: Anonymity and unlinkability are the basic requirements for every e-cash system. Anonymity means that when an e-cash is shown, no one can know who withdrew this e-cash. Unlinkability means that both the bank and shop cannot trace a user's consumption behavior. Due to anonymity and unlinkability, the user can preserve her/his privacy in an e-cash scheme.
Unforgeability:
No one can generate an e-cash except the bank. It is infeasible for anyone to forge an e-cash without the bank's private key. 3. Double-spending resistance:
When the bank receives an offline e-cash, it is able to check whether the received e-cash was doubly spent or not. The bank will store all of the spent e-cash(s) in a database. When a user doubly spends her/his e-cash, the bank can detect it via checking the database.
Anonymity control:
This consists of revokability and traceability. Revokability contains criminal revoking and double-spending revoking. In criminal revoking, the judge is able to revoke the anonymity of a given e-cash which has been spent in some illegal transactions. In double-spending revoking, the bank or the judge can find the identity who doubly spent an e-cash. Traceability means that the bank can trace a specific user if necessary. In our scheme, if the police want to trace some user, it will ask the bank to perform the tracing procedure.
Tamper resistance:
No one can tamper the information in an e-cash. In our scheme, when a user withdraws an e-cash from the bank, her/his identity will be embedded in the e-cash. This property guarantees that the embedded identity cannot be tampered.
No swindling:
No one can spend an e-cash except the real owner of the e-cash. In our scheme, after a user withdraws an e-cash, she/he will get a secret which will be used in the payment protocol. Therefore, the e-cash can be spent by the owner only.
Our proposed scheme
In our scheme, there are two main protocols, which are the withdrawal protocol and payment protocol, and four entities User, Bank, Shop and Judge. We use Chaum's blind signature [1] and chameleon hash functions [10] to design our e-cash scheme. A user withdraws an e-cash from the bank by running the withdrawal protocol and spends her/his e-cash by performing the payment protocol. Before describing our protocols, we define and explain some notations as follows.
Notations
• E x : This is a semantically secure encryption function where x can be a symmetric key or a public key. Let k A_B denote a shared key between entity A and entity B and pk_C be a public key of entity C . E A_B is a symmetric encryption function and E pk_C is an asymmetric encryption function.
• H: This is a one-way and collision free hash function. It is computationally infeasible to derive the input message from a given hashed value. And it is impossible to find two different input messages with the same hashed value. ) -
This is a chameleon hash function which was proposed by Krawczyk and Rabin and described in Section 2.2.
• (pk_j, sk_j): This is the judge's public-private key.
• l k , l r : These are security parameters.
-l k is the bit length of a session key.
-l r is the bit length of a random string.
• A judge device: The judge device is issued by the judge. It will be integrated into the system of the bank. Before the judge issues the device, it can perform public testing to show that the device is fair. Any information embedded in the hardware device cannot be modified by anyone else. We can make use of the technique of TPM (Trusted Platform Module) [11] to implement the judge device. The judge device contains -a random number/string generator -a public-key encryption/decryption function -a symmetric-key encryption/decryption function -a public-private key (pk_j, sk_j) of the judge -a public key of the bank -two hash functions, H and h HK .
Initialization
First, the bank selects two distinct large primes (p b , q b ) at random and computes n b = p b q b . Then it also randomly selects an integer e b such that GCD(φ(n b ), e b ) = 1 and 1 < e b < φ(n b ) and computes
. It randomly chooses a safe prime p and an element g ∈ Z * p of order q, where p = kq + 1, q is a prime and k is an integer. Finally, it also selects a one-way hash function H. Then the bank publishes (n b , e b , p, q, g, H), where (p, q, g) is the public parameter of the chameleon hash function.
The judge generates its public-private key (pk_j, sk_j). Then it publishes its public key and embeds and (pk_j, sk_j, H, h Hk , n b , e b ) into a temper-resistant device which will be issued to the bank.
The withdrawal protocol
When a user wants to withdraw an e-cash from her/his account, she/he has to be authenticated by the bank and then runs the withdrawal protocol. In this paper, we will not discuss the authentication mechanism, which can be any secure authentication protocol for the bank to authenticate the user. We depict the withdrawal protocol in Fig. 2 and describe it as follows.
The user randomly chooses three strings (k, m, r), where k ∈ {0, 1} l k and m, r ∈ Z * q . Then she/he sends E pk_j (k, m, r) to the bank.
2. Bank → The judge device: (E pk_j (k, m, r), µ). After the user is authenticated by the bank, the bank knows the identity ID u of the user. The bank sets µ = ID u and inputs E pk_j (k, m, r) and µ into the judge device. 3. The judge device → Bank: (β, E k (x,x, c, k, δ)).
After receiving E pk_j (k, m, r) and µ, the judge device uses sk_j to decrypt E pk_j (k, m, r) and gets (k, m, r). Then it randomly chooses three strings (r 1 , r 2 , c), where r 1 , r 2 ∈ {0, 1} l r and c ∈ Z * n b
After receiving (β, E k (x,x, c, k, δ)) from the judge device, the bank computes t = β 
) for e-cash tracing and recovery.
Unblinding:
After receiving (t, E k (x,x, c, k, δ)), the user decrypts E k (x,x, c, k, δ) and parses the 4th parameter in the decryption result as k ′ . Then she/he checks whether k ′ = k. If true, she/he computes Σ = ct mod n b . Finally, the user obtains an e-cash (Σ, y, m, r, δ).
The off-line payment protocol
In Fig. 3 , the payment protocol contains four steps.
When a user wants to make a payment to a shop, the shop will randomly choose a string r s and compute m After receiving m ′ , the user computes 
The recovery protocol
If a user, with identity µ, lost her/his e-cash(s), even if the previous blinding factors and encryption keys have been lost, she/he can perform the recovery protocol, which is depicted in Fig. 4 and described below, to recover the e-cash(s). Before running the following protocol, the user needs to be authenticated by the bank and perform the recovery protocol under a secure channel.
The user has to notify the bank that she/he wants to recover the e-cash(s) which had been withdrawn during some time period t p . She/He selects k ′ ∈ {0, 1} l k randomly and sends the bank
's, where these records were created for the user during the period t p and i ∈ {1, . . . , j}.
3. The judge device → Bank: 
)'s to the user.
Unblinding:
After receiving
)'s, the user decrypts them via k ′ and computes Σ i = ct mod n b for i ∈ {1, . . . , j}. Finally, she/he finishes the recovery protocol and obtains the e-cash(s) (Σ i , y i , m i , r i , δ i )'s again. Note that if there is any e-cash of (Σ i , y i , m i , r i , δ i )'s that has been spent by the user and she/he does not remember which ones had been spent, she/he can deposit all of these e-cash(s) into the bank and perform the withdrawal protocol again. However, she/he will lose the privacy of those spent e-cash(s). 
Anonymity control
Anonymity control contains revokability and traceability. Revokability makes it possible for the bank or the judge to revoke the anonymity of the owner of an e-cash which was doubly spent or spent in an illegal transaction. When the bank receives an e-cash, it must check whether the e-cash is doubly spent or not. In our scheme, the bank can easily detect doublespending and directly find out the user who doubly spent her/his e-cash. When there is an e-cash reported from an illegal transaction, the judge can revoke the owner's identity of the reported e-cash. For the traceability, the police can ask the bank to trace some e-cash(s) which were withdrawn by some specific users if necessary.
Revokability
• On double-spending:
If someone doubly spent her/his e-cash, the bank can revoke the anonymity of the owner of the e-cash. When a shop sends an e-cash (Σ 2 , y 2 , m 2 , r 2 , δ 2 ) to the bank, the bank will check whether the received e-cash has existed in the database. If the bank can find another e-cash (Σ 1 , y 1 , m 1 , r 1 , δ 1 ) where Σ 1 = Σ 2 , y 1 = y 2 , and δ 1 = δ 2 , the bank will obtain m 1 + xr 1 ≡ m 2 + xr 2 (mod q). Then the bank can compute
where x is formatted as (ID u ∥ r ′ ), where ID u is the identity of the user of the e-cash and r ′ is a random string. Therefore, the bank can efficiently derive the identity of the user without the judge's help.
• On illegal transaction:
Sometimes, if a user spent an e-cash for some illegal transactions such as money laundering, the e-cash will be reported to the judge and the privacy of the user will be revoked. The judge can decrypt δ = E pk_j (µ ∥ r 2 ) by its private key sk_j and get µ, where µ is the identity of the user.
Traceability
In some situation, the police may want to trace a specific user. • Trace a specific user before she/he withdraws e-cash(s):
Once the user performs the withdrawal protocol with the bank, the bank will input (E pk_j (k, (E k (x,x, c, k, δ) , k e p mod n p ), the police can get k and decrypt E k (x,x, c, k, δ). Then it puts δ in a blacklist and sends the blacklist to all shops. When the user µ spends her/his e-cash (Σ, h, m, r, δ) in a shop, the shop can observe the user via δ in the blacklist and report the transaction to the police.
• Trace a specific user after she/he withdraws e-cash(s):
If the user µ has withdrawn w e-cash(s), the bank can retrieve (µ, 
)'s to the police. Finally, the police obtains δ i and can trace the user via δ i for each i.
Comparisons
In this section, we compare our scheme with [12] [13] [14] in some features and the computation cost. The features are described as follows.
• Anonymity control:
This contains Revokability and Traceability which have been described in Section 3.2.
• Non-TTP-storing:
TTP does not need to store any information about the e-cash for anonymity control.
• Revokability without the help of TTP when double-spending:
When a user doubly spent an e-cash, the bank can directly find the identity of the user by itself without TTP's help.
• Recoverability:
The user can recover her/his lost e-cash(s).
Our scheme satisfies all of above features, but the others do not. We show the comparison result in Table 1 . In Table 2 , we measure the computation cost of the revoking procedure when double-spending, the payment protocol, and the withdrawal protocol. Besides, we also show the computation reduction percentage, which is defined as ( 
, where A is the computation cost of our scheme and C is the computation cost of another scheme in Table 2 . RWT : Revokability without the help of TTP. TP: Theoretical proof on unlinkability and unforgeability.
Table 2
The computation cost.
where A is the cost of our scheme and C is the cost of another scheme.
In our scheme, the bank only requires one modular inverse multiplication to revoke the anonymity of a user without the help of TTP when the user doubly spent her/his e-cash.
We use Rabin's public-key encryption algorithm [15] to implement E pk_j such that only one modular multiplication is required to compute E pk_j (k, m, r). Thus, the computation cost of the user in the proposed scheme is much less than that of a modular exponentiation computation. Therefor, our scheme is quite user efficient and especially suitable for smart-card and mobile users.
Provable security
In our proposed e-cash (E CRE C) scheme, there are some security issues that must be considered below. In the following, we give theoretical security proofs for unlinkability and unforgeability.
Unlinkability
In this section, we define a linkability game and show that our scheme satisfies the property of unlinkability. The linkability game is shown below.
Definition 1 (The Linkability Game).
Let k be a security parameter. Let U 0 and U 1 be two honest users and J be the judge that follows the E DRE C scheme, and let B be the bank that is involved in the following game with U 0 , U 1 , and J. The game environment is shown below.
• Step 1: According to the E DRE C scheme, B generates the bank's public-private key ((e b , n b ), (d b , p b , q b ) ), system parameters (p, q, g), and a hash function H. J generates the judge's public-private key (pk_j, sk_j).
• Step 2: B generates and outputs two message pairs (m 0 , m 1 ).
• Step 3: We randomly choose a bitb ∈ {0, 1} and place (rb, mb, yb) and (r 1−b , m 1−b , y 1−b ) on the private input tapes of U 0 and U 1 , respectively. The bitb will not be disclosed to B.
• Step 4: B performs the withdrawal protocol of the E DRE C scheme with U 0 and U 1 , respectively. 
Theorem 1.
The proposed E DRE C scheme satisfies the unlinkability property.
Proof of Theorem 1. In Step 5 of Definition 1, if B is given ⊥, it will determineb with probability 1 2 , which is exactly the same as a random guess ofb.
Here, we assume that B gets
) be the view of the data exchanged between U i and B during the withdrawal protocol, where i ∈ {0, 1}.
Given
, there always exists a value c i , where c i = (β 
Thus, the bank B succeeds in determiningb with probability 1 2 . We have that P[b Therefore, the proposed E DRE C scheme satisfies the unlinkability property.
Unforgeability
Bellare et al. introduced a problem which is called the RSA Chosen-Target Inversion (RSA-CTI) Problem [16] in 2003 and proved that it is hard. They also provided the following theorem. By Theorem 2, Chaum's RSA-based blind signature scheme [1] is secure against one-more forgery as long as the RSA-CTI problem is hard. Here, we provide a theorem to demonstrate that the proposed E DRE C scheme satisfies unforgeability if Chaum's RSA-based blind signature scheme is secure. Proof of Theorem 3. There exists an attacker A, a forger F , and a signing oracle S D of Chaum's blind signature scheme in the following game. According to the E DRE C scheme, we generate the judge's public-private key (pk_j, sk_j) and select a ) - hash function H. We also randomly select two primes (p, q) such that q|(p − 1) and choose a generator g with order q in Z * p . Let (n b , e b ) be the public key of S D . We publish (n b , e b , n j , e j , H, p, q, g). The model of the proof is shown in Fig. 5 . A can query an e-cash by sending E pk_j (k i , m i , r i ) to F and F will return (t i , E k i (x i ,x i , c i , k i , δ i )) to A as our proposed scheme. 
Conclusions
We have proposed a novel off-line e-cash scheme which supports the user to recover her/his lost e-cash(s) and supports the bank to efficiently retrieve the owner's identity of an e-cash which was doubly spent. The bank can deal with the revokability issue on double-spending by itself without the participation of TTP. We also provided formal proofs on unlinkability and unforgeability. Furthermore, we have shown the comparisons on some key features and the computation cost in Tables 1 and 2 . Due to the low computation cost on the user's side, we believe that our scheme is quite suitable for mobile or smart-card environments.
